1. Introduction

Aid conditionality has been a constant since the beginning of development policies. There are different types of conditionality, among which are economic and political conditionalities. Another type of conditionality has recently evolved, emerging from a specific connection between migration and development.

The migration-development link has been studied in some detail in the academic sphere. From a constructivist perspective, which affirms that political events are social constructions, the narratives and frameworks on the migratory event influence the conceptualization and political practice of the migration-development nexus. We can distinguish two frameworks on migration. The first considers it necessary to restrict the phenomenon of migration, since it conceives it as something negative with regard to the security and development of the countries of origin and destination. This conception connects migration with security and defends the use of development cooperation to restrict migratory flows; that is to say, the migratory conditionality. The second, unlike the previous one, seeks to expand migration in an “orderly” and “safe” manner given its positive effects on development at origin and destination.

The contribution of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development stands out, since this agenda, approved in 2015 by the United Nations (UN), constitutes the agreement that currently defines the global development agenda. It establishes the strategic lines, the objectives and the concrete measures to reduce and eradicate poverty and inequality worldwide, seeking to reduce the gap between industrialized and non-industrialized countries. One of the lines of action proposed by the 2030 Agenda has to do with the impact of migration on development. As we will discuss, it proposes an expansive approach to migration, since it proposes strengthening the positive synergies between migration and development. This raises tensions and contradictions with some of the initiatives promoted by institutions in different geographical areas, which elaborate negative narratives about migration and appeal to make aid conditional on migration objectives.

We seek to understand the framework of migration and the migration-development relationship proposed by the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. To this end, we study this document and the specialized academic literature.

2. Evolution of aid conditionality

Studies on conditionality have been present in different disciplines: development studies, international relations, among others, for several decades (Lewis, 1993; Killick, 1997; Mosley et al., 1991; Sanahuja, 1999 y 2001; Stokke, 1989; Stokke, 1995; Waller, 1995).

Aid conditionality is understood to be the different requirements set by donors to deliver Official Development Assistance (ODA) to recipient countries. Some definitions in this regard are the following:

• “Conditionality consists of the donor establishing certain conditions that must be met by the recipient as a prerequisite for accessing an aid agreement or for maintaining aid” (Stokke, 1995, p. 11).

• “Conditionality can be defined as the application of specific pre-established requirements, the respect of which on the part of the beneficiary determines directly or indirectly the decision of the donors to approve or continue the financing of a loan or gift” (Tujan Jr. & De Ceukelaire, 2009, p. 42).

We do not seek to delve into theoretical concepts about conditionality. It should be noted that in the specialized literature, conditionality is usually considered as an instrument of coercion that the donor country or institution exercises over the partner country. Therefore, it is conceived as a sample of the unequal correlation of forces (figure 1).

Figure 1
Conventional model of conditionality
Hughes et al. (2004).

Regarding the levels of effectiveness of conditionality, what is indicated by Stokke (1995) stands out, who points out the following: the internal characteristics of the recipient state, the recipient’s ability to use external pressure to its advantage, the recipient’s level of dependence on aid and its weight on its GDP, the intensity and relevance of bilateral relations, the possibility that an aid sanction generates a snowball effect among other donors and, finally, the existence or not of a coordinated action by donors or if it is a unilateral initiative.

Conditionality includes numerous practices and processes of many and varied actors. Actually, there are three criteria to classify the different types of conditionality. The first criterion is the moment in which it occurs. According to this, a differentiation can be made between ex ante conditionality, which is the case of the requirements that the partner must meet prior to the aid agreement or contract, and ex post conditionality, whose requirements are established for moments after the start of the aid. The second criterion has to do with whether the practice constitutes a “reward” or a “punishment”. A distinction is thus made between negative conditionality, consisting of a reduction in aid when human rights standards are not met, and positive conditionality, understood as an increase in aid in cases in which the partner shows progress in criteria such as humans rights (Waller, 1995). The aforementioned author highlights human rights, but this notion is transferable to other fields. The third criterion is related to the content of conditionality, specifically whether it appeals to economic or political issues.

Now we refer to the evolution of the history of conditionality, which is usually presented in two great historical stages or generations (Stokke, 1989; Stokke, 1995).

The first generation of conditionality is located in the 1980s and it was of an economic nature. It is a historical context marked by the Cold War and, in particular, by the Latin American debt crisis. As indicated by Killick (1998), a real explosion of conditionality in the eightiesConditionality was mainly the strategy of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for Latin American countries to face debt repayment. For this, the instrument used was the well-known Structural Adjustment Programs in the context of what came to be called the Washington Consensus. The conditions demanded by the World Bank and the IMF of aid recipients consisted of economic policy reforms aimed at reducing deficits and public spending, liberalizing trade and deregulating financial markets (Sanahuja, 1999 and 2001; Williamson, 1990).

A clear evolution was observed from project-based aid in the 1960s and 1970s to program-based aid in the 1970s. These programs, rather than responding to the previous developmental logic, did so with respect to macroeconomic stabilization priorities. The priority, rather than contributing to the development of partner countries, was to ensure that creditor countries could collect their debts. The economic dogma of the Washington Consensus rests on the belief that economic liberalization was the only path to economic growth. For this, it was understood as necessary the control of the deficit and inflation and financial deregulation (Williamson, 1990). The plan envisaged deepening the primary-exporter character of the economies of the peripheral countries, just in opposition to the strategy that they were beginning to theorize and put into practice from the theory of dependency. We refer to the well-known import substitution industrialization, which left behind the dependence on the export of primary products to the countries of the economic center.

The adjustment programs were a failure in economic and social terms, since not only did they not achieve their objectives of macroeconomic stabilization, but they also had an obvious negative impact on the levels of poverty and inequality. Growth did not come, but inequality and poverty did increase. Theoretically temporary strategies and instruments, such as social investment funds, were devised in order to tackle the rise in poverty and inequality. However, the chronification of these issues forced the temporal extension of these strategies and instruments. Ultimately, palliative measures were not enough and the social costs of stabilization and adjustment programs were very high in many countries (Glaessner et al., 1995).

At this stage, to economic conditionality must be added conditionality for security reasons, practiced fundamentally by the United States and its area of influence for the containment of communism, the latter constructed as an existential threat to the Western world. In this sense, US interests coexisted in relation to its desire for hegemonic continuity. On the one hand, the aid was essentially inserted in countries allied in the global struggle against communism. Likewise, it was used as an instrument to destabilize governments not related or with communist ideals. On the other hand, the aid was used within the framework of the free-market promotion agenda. This last form of conditionality intersected with the conditionality exercised by the World Bank and the IMF. (Sanahuja, 1999; Griffith-Jones, 1988).

The second generation of conditionality coincides with the end of the Cold War in 1989 and was of a political nature. It must, therefore, be situated in a context in which, given the absence of communism, initiatives for democratization and the promotion of the free market begin to be promoted through aid. When it came to the United States, it was a combination of national security, free markets, and democratization (Sanahuja, 1999). Specifically, political conditionality coalesces around the concept of good governance (Stokke, 1995) in reference to good governance, human rights and democracy. The political conditionality approach was taken up by organizations such as the UN, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) or the European Union (EU). It can be said that this form of conditionality has been present to this day.

One of its main manifestations of political conditionality in the 1990s was the stated objective of promoting human rights. In this sense, the practice of demanding respect for human rights from the countries receiving aid began to spread. An essential element and, in a way, a significant turn was the conception of the positive interrelation between human rights and development. The idea was to consider that progress in human rights was in itself an advance in development. In reality, human rights would end up being incorporated in a general and transversal way into the objectives of the global development agenda (Stokke, 1995).

One of the actors that began to push for human rights conditionality most strongly was the EU through the so-called essential elements and non-execution clauses, commonly known as human rights clauses. This was not a minor issue, since, by being included as essential elements of the EU’s international agreements, these agreements could be suspended in the event of non-compliance. For example, these clauses began to be included in the main EU trade and development agreements with third countries. They were first incorporated into the 1985 Lomé III Agreement and would continue to be included in the Lomé IV, the revised Lomé IV and the 2000 Cotonou Agreement (Díaz Silveira, 2007; Úbeda de Torres, 2009; Official Journal of the European Communities, Cotonou Agreement of 2000).

Later, the attacks of September 11, 2001 were a before and after in certain areas, including development cooperation policies. Some authors, such as Brown and Gränvingholt (2016), speak of the securitization of development aid in reference to the use of aid to meet donor security objectives and the establishment of requirements for partner countries in the field of security to access help.

The academic discussion regarding the securitization of aid (Harbone, 2012; Sanahuja & Schüneman, 2012) or of, as others prefer to call it, the security-development nexus (Tschirgi et al., 2010; Mavrotas, 2011) is already extensive. It is not the role of this article to systematically present this issue. However, it is pertinent to mention the context of this form of conditionality, since it is essential to understand migratory conditionality. What raises the security-development nexus is the thesis that there are certain security preconditions to be able to implement development strategies and initiatives. From more critical visions, usually ascribed to the securitization approach, it is understood that with the security-development nexus, and under the pretext of the existence of security threats, what is sought is to take extraordinary measures such as, orienting development cooperation policies towards security objectives. From the point of view of securitization, it is criticized that this results in a subordination of development objectives to security objectives.

If we apply the previous logic to the phenomenon of migration, we arrive at the type of conditionality that we are interested in analyzing in this work. It is in this post-9/11 context that it is of interest to continue analyzing the relationship between development and security and, as an added factor, international migration. All of this will become a new form of unprecedented aid conditionality. We explain it here below.

3. Migration and development: frameworks and approaches

According to Lavenex and Kunz (2008), there are two approaches to international migration. The first is an approach that relates migration to security and conceives it as a problematic phenomenon for societies of both origin and destination. The second is an approach that relates migration to development and conceives it as a positive phenomenon for societies of origin and for those of destination.

3.1. Negative approach to the migration-development nexus

The negative approach connects migration with security and has resulted through processes of securitization of migrations. The process of securitization of migrations has been explained by authors such as Huysmans (2000), Bigo (2002) and Bartoszewicz (2016), among others. This process implies on the part of a securitizing actor the framing of migration through speech acts (Buzan et al., 1998), as a threat to the security of a referent object, that is, of what should be protected. For this reason, an essentially negative idea of migration arises. Consequently, the policies derived from this approach and its corresponding narratives aim to reduce the migratory phenomenon. This approach forms a migration-security nexus where the security interests of the securitizing actor are a priority.

In the cosmopolitanism-nationalism and realism-idealism tensions, this approach is framed in anti-globalist, nationalist and realist visions. There are also nativist ideological elements, since it is understood that the distribution of citizen rights and duties must be strictly territorialized and circumscribed within the limits of the nation-state. Carl Schmitt’s “inside-outside” or “friend-enemy” dialectical tension is reproduced, where the interior of the political community is safe and orderly, the place for the contract, and the exterior is insecure and chaotic, the place for conflict (Bigo, 2008). For this reason, this approach views the free transnational movement of people as problematic and focuses on border control. This approach is problematic because it conceives human mobility as an exception, when it has been part of the norm of societies for centuries, as historical demography has shown. The Italian demographer Massimo Livi Bacci stands out in this field, among others (Bacci, 2012; Lacomba, 2008; Rodríguez & Grafton, 2007).

For Boswell (2003), in the EU there are two views on this approach. The first is long-term and has a preventive objective. The second is short-term and focuses on the control of migratory flows. The relationship between migration and development posed by the securitized approach is supported by both trends, as we explain below.

The securitized and negative approach to migration not only poses a relationship between migration and security, but also a migration-security-development nexus. The relationship between migration and development that he proposes is negative because it emphasizes the adverse effects of migratory flows on the countries of origin, transit and destination in terms of both development and security.

By understanding migration as an exceptional event, this approach starts from the premise that the causes of migration lie in some problematic event, specifically in development problems. Therefore, he argues that higher levels of development would reduce migration. This despite the broad consensus on the concept of migration hump (Martin, 1993) that shows otherwise. Specifically, it establishes that migration experiences three phases in relation to development. In the first, when levels of human development are very low, migration is also very low, since the population does not have the capacity to undertake migration projects. In the second, when levels of human development are low or medium, migration increases notably because individuals have sufficient education, training and resources to migrate. In the third, where there is a high or very high level of development, migration decreases because the population can potentially meet their vital and professional expectations in their countries of origin.

Due to the three phases explained above, the people who migrate are not the poor from the poorest countries, since it is not possible to start migratory projects without certain levels of income and vital and professional expectations.

Insisting on the premise that higher levels of development reduce migration, the negative approach conceives development policies as an instrument to reduce migration and thus guarantee security. Thus, the migration-development-security nexus is formulated in a security key and, in this way, migratory conditionality appears; that is, the set of processes and practices through which partner countries’ access to development aid is contingent on their collaboration with the migration and security objectives of donor countries.

A clear example of this approach is the one represented by the EU migration policy. Several authors (Sperling & Webber, 2019, p. 235; Lucarelli, 2019) have defined the EU as a collective securitizing actor in reference to the simultaneity of numerous securitization processes with which, through discourse and intersubjectively, the multiple security threats. These securitization processes cover various policy areas. In addition, different security issues are addressed from different levels of governance and policy instruments. This governance of security is shared between the Member States and the EU institutions. To speak of collective securitization, it is required that the actor in question (community institutions) act on behalf of other securitizing actors (Member States) with their own security objectives. Ultimately, collective securitization implies the aggregation of multiple securitizations by an actor that plays an articulating role. One of the fields studied from the concept of collective securitization in the EU is that of migration, particularly in relation to migration policy and the Schengen area (Ceccorulli, 2019). It is also worth noting the growing role of EU agencies such as Frontex in the processes of securitization of migrations (Delkáder-Palacios, 2020).

In official EU documents, such as the Global Strategy and for Foreign and Security Policy of 2016 (European Union, 2016), various narratives associated with the migratory phenomenon are reflected. The most notable are two. On the one hand, the security narrative, where migration is linked and included in the list of “classic” threats to security, such as terrorism or drug trafficking. It calls for political action focused on border control. On the other hand, the resilience narrative, which focuses on the idea of improving development conditions in the countries of origin of migration as a way to reduce migration flows (Ceccorulli & Lucarelli, 2017). As explained, this particular vision of the migration-development nexus is based on the premise that higher levels of development translate into lower levels of migration. The way to put this issue into practice in the framework of EU migration cooperation with third countries is the so-called incentive approach or “more for more” approach. The practice of offering more development aid (conceived as a mere incentive) is common in the EU’s relations with the countries of origin and transit of migration. The two most significant examples are Turkey and Morocco, due to the volume of amounts, but it is worth noting many other cases such as Niger, Senegal or Ethiopia (El Qadim, 2015; Gabrielli, 2017; Delkáder-Palacios, 2019).

3.2. Positive approach to the migration-development nexus

The positive approach to migration does not connect this phenomenon with security issues, but with the positive synergies generated by the relationship between migration and development. The work of Sørensen et al (2002) to understand the migration-development nexus stands out. This consists of the strategies by which the dynamics of migration and development are linked (Carling, 2019).

From a point of view of political ideas, in the aforementioned cosmopolitanism-nationalism and realism-idealism tensions, this approach has globalist, cosmopolitan and idealistic foundations. Specifically, this approach reflects Kant’s concept of world citizenship right, which appears in his famous work Perpetual Peace (Kant, 1967 [1795]). For this reason, citizens’ rights and duties have, as a principle, a more universal than national logic. We explain the characteristics of this approach below.

First, it is not based on the idea that migration is an exceptional event, but rather a common thread present throughout the entire history of humanity. Second, regarding the causes, as a complex phenomenon, migration cannot be explained exclusively as the consequence of development problems in the countries of origin. Therefore, according to the principle of the migration hump, it is argued that increasing levels of development do not reduce migratory flows, but rather increase. This issue has been evidenced in numerous studies for decades. For example, those of Akerman (1976), Martin (1993) and Martin-Shields et al. (2018), where it is explained that the increase in the levels of development usually accompanies an increase in the levels of migration. The functioning of the relationship between development and migration would have three stages. In the first stage, with low levels of development there are low levels of migration and mobility. In the second stage, with intermediate levels of development, migration increases with respect to the previous stage, because the material capacities to migrate also grow, as well as the vital expectations. Finally, in the third stage, with high levels of development, migration decreases again because the incentives to migrate decrease. The opportunity cost is higher in this last stage.

Third, in terms of consequences, migration is not understood as a problematic event that must be restricted, nor does it result in security problems for destination countries. Therefore, the securitized vision of migration is rejected. Likewise, it is also rejected that migration has negative effects in terms of development. The opposite idea is defended by highlighting the positive impact of, among other issues, remittances in the countries of origin which, according to the Center for Migration and Development (KNOMAD, 2018), based on data from the World Bank, triple the volume total official development assistance.

However, from this positive approach to migration and development, it is not only understood that migration contributes positively to development due to remittances. The vision goes further by understanding that mobility and migration are livelihood search strategies. In other words, migration would be from this perspective a strategy to fight poverty. Therefore, migration is not only not conceived as a problem or a threat to security, but is also conceived as a factor of development. For this reason, the political proposals based on this approach are not located in the restriction of the migratory phenomenon, but in its expansion in an orderly manner. Other strategies are usually added to the issue of remittances, such as working with diasporas, the creation and undertaking of international business initiatives, taking advantage of the connection between several countries of the migrant persons. Finally, a relevant field in which migration can contribute to development can be highlighted. These are international political activities that diasporas can and often do to exert pressure in terms of democratization and extension of rights in their countries of origin. All these issues make countries with large contingents of nationals residing abroad dedicate many efforts to maintain contact and interrelation with their diasporas, highlighting both political and economic objectives (Sørensen et al., 2002).

Figure 2
Remittance flows to low and middleincome countries that are higher than official development aid and more stable than private capital flows
knomad (2018).

In short, the approach that we have explained assumes that migration is a fundamental part of the transformation processes derived from the economic and social development of economies, according to the idea of mobility transition by Castles (2009, p. 7).

Likewise, it insists on the contribution that migratory flows have to face the demographic and population imbalance suffered by a large part of the developed countries.

Fourth, in coherence with the previous points, as we pointed out, under this approach, migration does not constitute a threat to security and its causes are not only development problems at source. For this reason, this approach rejects instrumentalizing development aid to reduce migration, because in addition to not being effective for this purpose, such purpose is not desirable because it would negatively impact the development of the countries of origin. As an alternative, it is proposed to facilitate all processes and strategies related to migration that have a multiplier effect on the development of countries, especially of origin, but also in those of destination.

4. 2030 Agenda, migration and development

The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development is the strategy that currently defines the objectives and strategies of the global development agenda. It is a legally non-binding political document signed by the 193 UN member states in 2015, within the general assembly of that organization. As stated in its preamble, the 2030 Agenda is a

[…] action plan for people, planet and prosperity that aims to strengthen universal peace within a broader concept of freedom, recognizing that the eradication of poverty is the greatest challenge facing the world, requirement indispensable for sustainable development. (UN, 2015, p. 1)

To move towards higher levels of sustainable development, the Agenda defined 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) and 169 targets associated to the different goals. The object of this study is not to analyze the particularities of all the SDGs, but to focus on the migration-development nexus.

In particular, the questions we are trying to answer are the following: What framework of migration is reflected in the 2030 Agenda? and What kind of relationship does it propose between migration and development?

The political orientation of the 2030 Agenda can be defined as cosmopolitan and universalist. The principle of universalism is clear if we take into account that the term “universal” appears up to 28 times in the document. This orientation becomes evident when the following is pointed out:

We are committed to fostering cross-cultural understanding, tolerance, mutual respect, and the ethical values of global citizenship and shared responsibility. We recognize the natural and cultural diversity of the world, and also that all cultures and civilizations can contribute to sustainable development and play a crucial role in facilitating it. (UN, 2015, p. 11)

In the above statement, Kant’s previously highlighted idea of world citizenship is expressly mentioned. It can be said that there is a clear alignment with the principle of interculturality.

It is of interest to analyze the diagnosis made by the 2030 Agenda regarding the interconnection between security and development: “[…] sustainable development cannot be achieved without peace and security, and peace and security are at risk without sustainable development” (UN, 2015, p.11). The interdependence between security and development leads to the objective of creating peaceful, just and inclusive societies. Inequalities, corruption and poor governance generate violence, insecurity and injustice. Therefore, SDG 16 focuses on developing effective and inclusive institutions that guarantee human rights, the rule of law and good governance. In other words, a security-development nexus is formulated in terms of mutual reciprocity, but not under the logic of the securitization of development.

Now, we are interested in delving into the idea that the Agenda raises about human mobility. In this sense, the following is established:

We recognize the positive contribution of migrants to inclusive growth and sustainable development. We also recognize that international migration is a multidimensional reality of great relevance for the development of countries of origin, transit and destination that requires coherent and comprehensive responses. We will cooperate at the international level to guarantee the security, order and regularity of migration, fully respecting human rights and providing humanitarian treatment to migrants, whatever their migratory status, and to refugees and displaced people. Such cooperation should also strengthen the resilience of communities hosting refugees, particularly in developing countries. We underline that migrants have the right to return to their country of nationality and we recall that States must ensure that nationals who return to their countries are properly received. (UN, 2015, p. 9)

First, there is an explicit recognition of the contribution of migration to the development of countries of origin, transit and destination. In addition, it is conceived as a multidimensional phenomenon, which moves away from reductionist views on migration.

Second, three criteria are introduced on how migratory flows should be: security, order and regularity. This should be explained, since they will be precisely the key ideas of the Global Compact on Migration, signed in Marrakech in 2018 (UN, 2018). Said normative device on migration reveals a paradox or contradiction: the current deregulation of the migratory phenomenon in a globalized world with free movement of goods and capital. As Brown (2015) points out, these are some of the characteristics of neoliberalism. Certainly, these three ideas confirm that international migrations lack sufficient regulation, with almost no legal and safe pathways for migration (Spanish Commission for Refugee Assistance, 2019). In the case of asylum and refuge, there are legally binding instruments such as the refugee status (UN, 1951) and its additional protocol of 1967, not being so in the case of labor migration. However, both migrants and refugees are forced to undertake journeys through routes that put their own physical integrity at risk. The reference to order and regularity can be analyzed in terms of efficiency of public policies and equitable distribution among host countries, but it can also give rise to understandings of migration associated with demographic interests and labor markets of destination countries.

Third, there is an emphasis on respecting the human rights of all migrants and refugees, regardless of their immigration status. This means that, in addition to a narrative of migration connected to development, the 2030 Agenda deploys a humanitarian framework regarding migration. In this sense, reference is also made to the right of access to education and the right to safe and risk-free work for migrants.

Migration is included in SDG 10: “reduce inequality within and among countries”. Specifically in goal 10.7, which states the following: “Facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through the implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies” (onu, 2015, p. 24).

In addition, goal 10.7.c sets a very specific measure, which has to do with remittances, to achieve progress in goal 10.7: “By 2030, reduce to less than 3% the transaction costs of remittances from migrants and eliminate remittance corridors with costs higher than 5 % ”(UN, 2015, p. 24).

Finally, the reference to the principle of ownership in the 2030 Agenda should be noted. Aligning with the Paris Declaration (OECD, 2015), the 2030 Agenda rejects aid conditionality, defending that each country is responsible for its social and economic development, thereby highlighting the importance of national development strategies. It also recognizes the leadership of the countries in policies to combat poverty.

5. Conclusions

All the above elements lead us to conclude that the 2030 Agenda makes a more developmental and humanitarian framework for migration than a security framework. For this reason, it unequivocally establishes a positive relationship between migration and development. On the one hand, the 2030 Agenda avoids the securitized approach to migration, which poses this phenomenon as a problem or threat to security. This issue should be highlighted, since it runs counter to the political praxis in the field of migration of many of the actors, highlighting, as we have seen, the case of the EU and its Member States. The approach to migration is based on two main ideas: first, migration is a social phenomenon that contributes positively to development and, second, although the human right to migrate is not recognized, the concept of global citizenship is mentioned. The latter constitutes an ethical-normative basis and relaunches the political discussion on the human right to migrate. Therefore, a fundamental issue is that the 2030 Agenda does not seek to reduce migration, but to favor it. However, not all types of migration, only the one which is orderly, safe and regular. What is actually formulated is the objective of finding a balance between the free exercise of human mobility and the host capacities of the destination countries.

On the other hand, the 2030 Agenda does not propose an instrumental vision of development as a mechanism to reduce migration. Consistent with the principles and guidelines of development policies, the 2030 Agenda reaffirms the idea that development aid has its own goal: the eradication of poverty. This is relevant because it implies an explicit rejection of the subordination of the development agenda to economic and security imperatives and interests, a common practice in donors since the origins of foreign aid (Sanahuja, 1999). In addition, in line with the Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness (OECD, 2015), appropriation is defended and conditionality is rejected because it is understood that aid should not be conditioned to goals other than development, but rather to partner countries which must exercise effective authority over their own development.

It is important to highlight that the approach to migration endorsed by some of the most relevant political actors in the international system is not that of the 2030 Agenda, but the negative and securitized approach. Proof of this are the narrative frameworks that present migration as a threat to security and that are reflected in securitized migration policies. A clear example is the aforementioned case of the EU, as a result of the misnamed “refugee crisis” of 2015 (Delkáder-Palacios, 2019). Frames, narratives and policies are not only modified by political statements such as the 2030 Agenda, but by influencing at least two areas. First, in the field of ideas, it is necessary to deconstruct erroneous and unfounded imaginaries about migration, offering alternative narratives based on the concept of global citizenship. For this, it is necessary to desecuritize the narrative frameworks on migration. Second, in the field of policies, effective and legally binding mechanisms are necessary that establish obligations for the actors to facilitate human mobility as a factor of development. In short, to deploy policies based on a positive approach between migration and development, a notable discursive turn is required to redefining the collective understanding of the phenomenon of migration.

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Notes

Author notes